AN EXAMINATION OF MENTAL CONCEPT AND THE PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS RELATING TO: THOUGHT, EMOTIONS, PERCEPTIONS AND BEHAVIOR, SENSATION, MEMORY AND IMAGINATION, PERSONAL IDENTITY, FREEWILL AND DETERMINATION VIS-À-VIS GOTTFRIED WILHELM VON LEIBNIZ IMMATERIAL SUBSTANCE CALLED "THE MONADS"

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Abstract

Human thought from one angle is a product of natural phenomenon while from other angles is beyond natural. Some are said to be products of biological, super-natural and the rest of them. But for Leibniz it is a product of immaterial substance which is harmonious in natural. This paper therefore, is an attempt to understand theses mental concept and philosophical problems with an eye of Leibniz immaterial substance called "The Monads"

Keywords: *Thought, Emotions, Perceptions, Behavior, Sensation, Memory Imagination, Personal Identity, Freewill, Determination, Monads*

Statement of the problem in general outlook and its connection with important scientific and practical tasks

Mental concept and the philosophical problems related to them remains an academic inquiry of topnotch discuss that in most times breaks the lion bones for understanding. The origination of these mental realities like: thought, emotions, perceptions and behavior, sensation, memory and imagination, personal identity, freewill and determination becomes a mirage for many scholars to understand their origin and modus operandi. Are they product of the mind, if yes where is the mind located in human body? Are they

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product of natural occurrences, biological, super-natural, intuition, or spiritual? Let us make a critical attempt to understand this using Leibniz immaterial substance called "The Monads"

A great German metaphysician came to a solution of the problem somewhat similar to the one developed by the occasionalists but with a basic difference. Gottfried Wilhelm Von Leibniz (1646-1716) shared the view of the occasionalists that there cannot be interaction. For instance, if one wishes to tear down an idea, one cannot pull it apart with one hand, nor can one dynamite it. One can only take it apart logically.

Similarly if someone wants to blow up a bridge, an idea will not do. In short there is simply no evidence of any divine synchronization of the functioning of body and mind as tenable. He regarded as more logical to remove the idea of body and mind all together.

Leibniz could not see how the conception of material substance could be defended. Such a substance is that which exist in itself and is independent, it cannot be divided, and yet extension or matter is divisible and thus cannot be of the nature of the substance. Yet all spiritual substance are of the same type. Are these mental realities all spiritual?

Analysis of latest research where the solution of the problem was initiated

Thought

Philosophy is an activity of thought. And thought is a product of Philosophy. This is a particular unique type of thought or style of thinking. Philosophy is not to be confused with its product. ... Philosophy, insofar as it may be correlated at all to a "way of Life", is a form of thinking meant to guide action or to prescribe a way of life.

Human thought is an amazing thing. It has given us science, literature, morality, and last but certainly not least philosophy. Thought even has the power to create new realities. And I'm not primarily thinking of literature and the arts or even of technology. I'm thinking of the entire social world. Every size social reality from clubs to nations and everything in between is a creation of the human mind, of human thought in particular. They all exist because we simply think them into existence.

Of course, the mind is not all sweetness and light. Besides all the things I just mentioned, it has also given us superstition, slavery, and war. But that just makes the nature and power of human thought all the more puzzling. The mind that spent millennium after millennium, mired in archaic social formations, in the grips of irrational superstitions is the very same mind, with the very same powers of thought, as the mind that produced science, philosophy, and art. Our goal is to understand just what human thought is such that it produces both the science and superstition, both democracy and slavery.

So let's start at the beginning and ask just what thoughts are in the first place. When you ask the person in the street, like our roving philosophical reporter did, she or he is liable tell you that thoughts are that little voice inside your head where that means inside the brain, if the person is a materialist and inside the mind, if person is a dualist. But we're trying to figure out *what* thoughts are, not *where* they are. If we're going to understand

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the power of thought, we need to first understand the different kinds of thoughts and how each different kind works.

Take a simple thing like the belief that there is beer in the fridge. That's a thought. But it's only one kind of thought. And suppose that you want a beer. That's a thought too. But a different kind of thought – a desire. Beliefs represent, or misrepresent, how things are in the world. They are the kinds of things that can be true or false. Hopefully our beliefs are more true than false. If our beliefs are false, the rational thing to do is change our beliefs to match the world. Desires, on the other hand, don't represent how the world is. We don't say that my desire to have a beer is false just because I don't have one. But we do say that my desire is unsatisfied, when you want a beer, but don't have one. The way to satisfy a desire is not to change *it*, but to change *the world*. That's where a third kind of thought comes in – intentions. If you believe there's a beer in the fridge and you really want a beer, then maybe you will form a new kind of thought – an intention. An intention is the kind of thing that can make you get off your duff and walk over to the refrigerator and get a beer. Or not -- if you're a weak willed, lazy sort.

Now we really want to understand the power of thought and what it actually does in the world we have to to understand how beliefs manage to represent, or misrepresent, the way the world is; how desires manage to set forth ways the world might become; and how intentions move us to act to actually change the world. That may seem like a very tall order, but it's a little more simple than it might at first seem, because beliefs, desires, and intentions are built out the same basic building blocks -- just put together in different ways. In particular, they are all built out of concepts or ideas. My belief that there is beer in the fridge, my desire to drink a beer, and my intention to go and get a beer all involve the concept or idea of beer, for example. So we can make a start on understanding the power of thought by thinking about the nature of concept or ideas, where they come from, and the different ways they can be put together to create such a wide-variety of thoughts. And once we've got a handle on that, we can think more about the different things that different kinds of thoughts do.

Emotion

Emotion" is a term that came into use in the English language in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as a translation of the French term "émotion" but did not designate "a category of mental states that might be systematically studied" until the mid-nineteenth century. At the same time, many of the things we call emotions today have been the object of theoretical analysis since Ancient Greece, under a variety of language-specific labels such as passion, sentiment, affection, affect, disturbance, movement, perturbation, upheaval, or appetite. This makes for a long and complicated history, which has progressively led to the development of a variety of shared insights about the nature and function of emotions, but no consensual definition of what emotions are, either in philosophy or in affective science.

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A widely shared insight is that emotions have components, and that such components are jointly instantiated in prototypical episodes of emotions. Consider an episode of intense fear due to the sudden appearance of a grizzly bear on your path while hiking.

At first blush, we can distinguish in the complex event that is fear an evaluative component (e.g., appraising the bear as dangerous), a physiological component (e.g., increased heart rate and blood pressure), a phenomenological component (e.g., an unpleasant feeling), an expressive component (e.g., upper eyelids raised, jaw dropped open, lips stretched horizontally), a behavioral component (e.g., a tendency to flee), and a mental component (e.g., focusing attention).

One question that has divided emotion theorists is: Which subset of the evaluative, physiological, phenomenological, expressive, behavioral, and mental components is essential to emotion? The answer to this "problem of parts" (Prinz 2004) has changed at various times in the history of the subject, leading to a vast collection of theories of emotions both in philosophy and in affective science. Although such theories differ on multiple dimensions, they can be usefully sorted into three broad traditions, which we call the Feeling Tradition, the Evaluative Tradition and the Motivational Tradition (Scarantino 2016).

The Feeling Tradition takes the way emotions feel to be their most essential characteristic, and defines emotions as distinctive conscious experiences. The Evaluative Tradition regards the way emotions construe the world as primary, and defines emotions as being (or involving) distinctive evaluations of the eliciting circumstances. The Motivational Tradition defines emotions as distinctive motivational states.

Each tradition faces the task of articulating a prescriptive definition of emotions that is theoretically fruitful and compatible at least to some degree with ordinary linguistic usage. And although there are discipline-specific theoretical objectives, there also is a core set of explanatory challenges that tends to be shared across disciplines:

- Differentiation: How are emotions different from one another, and from things that are not emotions?
- Motivation: Do emotions motivate behavior, and if so how?
- Intentionality: Do emotions have object-directedness, and if so can they be appropriate or inappropriate to their objects?
- Phenomenology: Do emotions always involve subjective experiences, and if so of what kind?

For example, a viable account of anger should tell us how anger differs from fear and from non-emotional states (differentiation), whether and how anger motivates aggressive behaviors (motivation), whether and how anger can be about a given state of affairs and be considered appropriate with respect to such state of affairs (intentionality), and whether and how anger involves a distinctive subjective experience (phenomenology).

Perception and behavior

The notion that perception (or the activation of a perceptual representation) may lead to corresponding overt behavior has been recognized since long ago by some of our most influential thinkers (see, e.g., Arnold, 1946; Charcot, 1886; James, 1890; Koffka, 1925;

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Piaget, 1946). Underlying this idea is the assumption that apart from perceptual or cognitive representations (e.g., traits, stereotypes), behaviors are mentally represented as well and that these perceptual and behavioral representations are somehow intimately linked. Indeed, many theorists have discussed this possibility. Prinz (1990), in a review of the research on the "common coding" hypothesis, explained why mere perception can affect overt behavior relatively easily: Acts are completely commensurate and continuous with percepts. Percepts and acts both refer to events with comparable attributes. Both are characterized by location (in space and time) and contents (in terms of physical and non-physical properties), the only difference being that percepts refer to ongoing, actor-independent events and acts to to-be-generated, actor-dependent events, (pp. 171-172).

Research by Rosch and Mervis [18] supports the notion of common coding of percepts and acts. Participants in their study were asked to generate attributes of a target word. Participants listed not only perceptual attributes but also behavioral responses. Carver and Scheier (1981), in discussing the research by Rosch and Mervis [18], provided a nice example. The target apple elicited "red," "round,1 ' and "grows on trees" but also "you can eat it." Hence, it seems that, in line with the common coding hypothesis, actions are encoded in much the same way as other (perceptual) attributes of a given stimulus [18]. This suggests that perception and action have shared representational systems, again, an idea that has been postulated by several other researchers [5].

The available evidence for effects of the activation of mental representations on overt behavior is largely confined to areas of behavior of a relatively elementary nature, such as arm movements (Eidelberg, 1929; Smeets & Brenner, 1995). The early research of Eidelberg (1929) can be taken as an example. Eidelberg (1929; see also Prinz, 1990) instructed participants to point at their nose at the verbal instruction "nose" and to point to a lamp upon hearing the word "lamp." During this task, the experimenter also pointed to his nose or to the lamp. As soon as the experimenter started to make mistakes (pointing at his nose after the instruction "lamp"), participants made mistakes too, although they were explicitly instructed to follow the verbal instructions and not the experimenter's movements.

Thus, it seems that the activation of a mental representation of a specific movement (here, the perception of a movement) resulted in the tendency to actually make this movement. Another domain in which perception has been shown to affect action is speech production. It was shown that people unconsciously take over accents of others [23]. Moreover, people that are primed with a certain syntax tend to use this syntax when producing a sentence [14, 15], even when the syntax is grammatically incorrect [35]. Speech production, thus, is also partly under perceptual control. Recently, Bargh and colleagues went a step further. Bargh, Chen, and Burrows (1996) reported an experiment in which participants were subliminally primed with the stereotype of African Americans. Participants thus primed behaved more hostile toward a confederate [34].

In comparison with participants in a control condition, primed participants showed more aggressive facial expressions, and, more pertinent to our present argument, they expressed

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more verbal hostility. Hence, the influence of perception on behavior goes beyond relatively simple, motoric responses (e.g., arm movements). We want to take another step by establishing the generalizability of the perception-behavior link to behavior of an even greater complexity. The question is, can very complex behavior be evoked by mere perception? The relation between perception and behavior in, for instance, the studies by Eidelberg (1929) was assumed to be very direct. The mental representation that is activated refers directly to behavior (cf. the "common coding hypothesis' * formulated by Prinz).

For more complex behaviors, this relation is, of necessity, more complicated. If for instance, we activate the mental representation of intelligence, this should, according to the same principle, result in the onset of "intelligent behavior." However, unlike arm movements, intelligence is not a behavior. If one assumes, though, that more abstract constructs such as intelligence refer to classes of behavior, or behavioral patterns (such as harder thinking or better concentration) on a more concrete level, and if one further assumes that behavioral representations are hierarchically structured so that abstract behavioral constructs can activate more concrete behaviors, it is conceivable that the activation of a more abstract mental representation also leads to overt behavior in line with the primed construct. Below, we attempt to explicate the assumed underlying process in some detail. Theoretically, one can understand the unconscious instigation of complex behavior on stereotype activation as the unrollment of a partly hierarchically structured chain of events. As stereotypes are associated with traits the priming of a stereotype would activate the related trait constructs [13, 23].

In our view, the activation of a trait (e.g., aggressive) may, in turn, activate a number of behavioral representations characteristic of the trait involved (e.g., looking angrily, speaking in an offensive tone of voice, and maybe even wanting to hit someone or something). In fact, in recent research on emotions, such action components have been shown to be evoked by emotion concepts [33]. We assume that traits are also associated with behavioral representations that constitute instantiations of the trait in question. Suggestive evidence to that effect may be found in early spontaneous trait inference research in which, although the claim of spontaneous linkage is in the reverse direction, trait cues facilitate recall of behavioral episodes (Winter & Uleman, 1984; Winter, Uleman, & Cunnif, 1985). As a result of the existence of the trait-behavioral representation links, the priming of a stereotype may elicit the unconscious tendency to perform more or less complex behaviors typical of the traits associated with this stereotype.

Thus, for instance, the activation of the trait intelligent (either by directly priming the trait or by priming a stereotype that contains this trait) may lead to the activation of a set of concrete behavioral representations stored under it (e.g., to concentrate on a problem, to adopt an analytical approach, to think systematically about possible solutions).

Sensation

The *physical* process during which our sensory organs those involved with hearing and taste, for example respond to external stimuli is called sensation. Sensation happens when

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you eat noodles or feel the wind on your face or hear a car horn honking in the distance. During sensation, our sense organs are engaging in transduction, the conversion of one form of energy into another. Physical energy such as light or a sound wave is converted into a form of energy the brain can understand: electrical stimulation. After our brain receives the electrical signals, we make sense of all this stimulation and begin to appreciate the complex world around us.

Memory and Imagination

Remembering is a fundamental cognitive process, which is involved in virtually all other important cognitive functions, such as reasoning, perception, problem solving, and speech. Because memory is a central component of the mind, it is not surprising that theorizing about memory is as old as philosophy itself. Contemporary philosophers are primarily interested in the role of memory in various metaphysical and epistemological debates. For example, memory is often discussed in relation to personal identity, epistemic justification, and the experience of time—and to a lesser extent, collective memory, the hypothesis of extended memory, non-conceptual memory contents, and the ethics of memory.

Imagination is a speculative mental state that allows us to consider situations apart from the here and now. Historically, imagination played an important role in the works of many of the major philosophical figures in the Western tradition – from Aristotle to Descartes to Hume to Kant. By the middle of the twentieth century, in the wake of the behavioristic mindset that had dominated both psychology and philosophy in the early part of the century, imagination had largely faded from philosophical view and received scant attention from the 1960s through the 1980s. But imagination returned to the limelight in the late twentieth century, as it was given increasing prominence in both aesthetics and philosophy of mind.

In aesthetics, interest in imagination derives in large part from its role in our engagement with works of art, music, and literature. For example, some philosophers have called upon imagination to capture the essence of fiction, while others have called upon it to explain how listeners understand the expressive nature of musical works. Yet others have seen imagination as centrally involved in ontological questions about art; in particular, they take works of art to be best understood as in some sense imaginary objects.

In philosophy of mind, imagination plays an especially important role in discussions of mindreading, that is, our ability to understand the mental states of others. While theory theorists claim that we do this by calling upon a folk theory of mind, simulation theorists claim that we mindread by simulating the mental states of others – with simulation typically cashed out in terms of imagination. More generally, philosophers of mind who are interested in questions of cognitive architecture tend to be especially interested in imagination and its relationship to belief and desire.

In fact, imagination has come to play an important role in a wide variety of philosophical contexts in addition to aesthetics and philosophy of mind. It has traditionally been central to discussions of thought experimentation and modal epistemology, where an analogy is

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often drawn between the way perception justifies beliefs about actuality and the way imagination seems to justify beliefs about possibility. Imagination has also been invoked to explain pretence, dreaming, empathy, delusion, and our ability to engage in counterfactual reasoning.

In the history of philosophy, the relationship between memory and imagination has been a matter of debate. The surveys and the controversy and explores some reasons that have led philosophers to assume that memory and imagination are distinct. It offers a historical overview of the main views concerning the distinction between memory and imagination. This suggests that much of the philosophical discussion surrounding the nature of this distinction obfuscates at least three different senses in which memory and imagination could differ. One sense concerns the difference between mental events that should be considered memories versus those that should be considered imaginations. A second sense concerns the nature of the relationship between the mental faculties or systems of memory and imagination. Finally, a third sense concerns the phenomenology of remembering versus that of imagining.

Aims of paper. **Methods**

Personal Identity

Personal identity is the concept you develop about yourself that evolves over the course of your life. This may include aspects of your life that you have no control over, such as where you grew up or the color of your skin, as well as choices you make in life, such as how you spend your time and what you believe. You demonstrate portions of your personal identity outwardly through what you wear and how you interact with other people. You may also keep some elements of your personal identity to yourself, even when these parts of yourself are very important.

Have you ever struggled with the question, 'Who am I?' or thought about who you might become in the future? These questions have been thought about and discussed throughout history, in particular by philosophers who have immersed themselves in the search for knowledge about the nature of being human. Such questions as, 'What does it mean to be a person?' and 'Do I matter?' have engaged key thinkers and created conversations that we still grapple with in our society. Most people feel they want to endure in some way, both in their lives and beyond death. The philosophy of personal identity aims to address these matters of existence and how we even know we exist through time.

How do you know you are the same person you were as a child? Is it because you remember yourself growing within the same body you have now? Or is it because you perceive that you have the same mind? What criteria can be used to confirm you are, in fact, a 'person'?

When you ask yourself how you know you are the same person you were as a baby, this is a question of persistence. In this context, persistence means our existence across time and how we can prove it. In other words, we perceive that our self 'persists' through our life as the same human being, but how do we know for sure? The philosophers Plato and

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René Descartes, as well as many religions, have proposed that we persist because we have a soul, a timeless essence that continues in some form even after the death of our living, breathing human body.

Descartes, in particular, aimed to provide a scientifically-oriented argument for this enduring inner self. He used rational arguments and examples to demonstrate that the mind and body are distinct. He promoted the view that the mind can exist and persist without the body. This distinction between a person's mind and body is known as mind-body dualism and has been an influential and powerful theory in our society. Here's an illustration of mind and body dualism by Descartes:

Even today, you may often hear the phrase, 'body and soul'. This way of thinking has evolved from the ideas of religious traditions as well as philosophical ways of viewing our personal identity.

Freewill and Determination

Free will is the idea that we are able to have some choice in how we act and assumes that we are free to choose our behavior, in other words we are self determined. ... Personal agency refers to the choices we make in life, the paths we go down and their consequences.

Free will is the capacity for agents to choose between different possible courses of action unimpeded. Free will is closely linked to the concepts of moral responsibility, praise, guilt, sin, and other judgments which apply only to actions that are freely chosen. It is also connected with the concepts of advice, persuasion, deliberation, and prohibition. Traditionally, only actions that are freely willed are seen as deserving credit or blame. Whether free will exists, what it is and the implications of whether it exists or not are some of the longest running debates of philosophy and religion. Some conceive of free will as the right to act outside of external influences or wishes.

Some conceive free will to be the capacity to make choices undetermined by past events. Determinism suggests that only one course of events is possible, which is inconsistent with a libertarian model of free will. Ancient Greek philosophy identified this issue, which remains a major focus of philosophical debate. The view that conceives free will as incompatible with determinism is called incompatibilism and encompasses both metaphysical libertarianism (the claim that determinism is false and thus free will is at least possible) and hard determinism (the claim that determinism is true and thus free will is not possible). Incompatibilism also encompasses hard incompatibilism, which holds not only determinism but also its negation to be incompatible with free will and thus free will to be impossible whatever the case may be regarding determinism.

In contrast, compatibilists hold that free will is compatible with determinism. Some compatibilists even hold that determinism is necessary for free will, arguing that choice involves preference for one course of action over another, requiring a sense of how choices will turn out. Compatibilists thus consider the debate between libertarians and hard determinists over free will vs. determinism a false dilemma different compatibilists offer very different definitions of what "free will" means and consequently find different types

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of constraints to be relevant to the issue. Classical compatibilists considered free will nothing more than freedom of action, considering one free of will simply if, had one counterfactually wanted to do otherwise, one could have done otherwise without physical impediment. Contemporary compatibilists instead identify free will as a psychological capacity, such as to direct one's behavior in a way responsive to reason, and there are still further different conceptions of free will, each with their own concerns, sharing only the common feature of not finding the possibility of determinism a threat to the possibility of free will.

Again the free will vs determinism debate revolves around the extent to which our behavior is the result of forces over which we have no control or whether people are able to decide for themselves whether to act or behave in a certain way.

External Determinism

External (environmental) determinism see the cause of behavior as being outside the individual, such as parental influence, the media, or school. Approaches which adopt this position include behaviorism and social learning theory. For example, Bandura (1961) showed that children become aggressive through observation and imitation of their violent parents.

Internal Determinism

The other main supporters of determinism are those who adopt a biological perspective. However for them it is internal, not external, forces that are the determining factor. According to sociobiology evolution governs the behavior of a species and genetic inheritance that of each individual within it. For example Bowlby (1969) states a child has an innate (i.e. inborn) need to attach to one main attachment figure (i.e. monotropy).

Personality traits like extraversion or neuroticism, and the behavior associated with them, are triggered by neurological and hormonal processes within the body. There is no need for the concept of an autonomous human being. Ultimately this view sees us as no more than biological machines and even consciousness itself is interpreted as a level of arousal in the nervous system.

Freud also viewed behavior being controlled from inside the individual, in the form of unconscious motivation or childhood events, known as psychic determinism.

There are different levels of determinism

Hard determinism sees free will as an illusion and believes that every event and action has a cause. Behaviorists are strong believers in hard determinism. Their most forthright and articulate spokesman has been B. F. Skinner. Concepts like “free will” and “motivation” are dismissed as illusions that disguise the real causes of human behavior. In Skinner’s scheme of things the person who commits a crime has no real choice. (S)he is propelled in this direction by environmental circumstances and a personal history, which makes breaking the law natural and inevitable. For the law-abiding, an accumulation of reinforcers has the opposite effect. Having been rewarded for following rules in the past the individual does so in the future. There is no moral evaluation or even mental calculation involved. All behavior is under stimulus control.

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Soft determinism represents a middle ground, people do have a choice, but that choice is constrained by external or internal factors. For example, being poor doesn't make you steal, but it may make you more likely to take that route through desperation. Soft determinism suggests that some behaviors are more constrained than others and that there is an element of free will in all behavior.

However, a problem with determinism is that it is inconsistent with society's ideas of responsibility and self control that form the basis of our moral and legal obligations. In additional limitation concerns the facts that psychologists cannot predict a person's behavior with 100% accuracy due to the complex interaction of variables which can influence behavior.

Freewill

Free will is the idea that we are able to have some choice in how we act and assumes that we are free to choose our behavior, in other words we are self determined. For example, people can make a free choice as to whether to commit a crime or not (unless they are a child or they are insane). This does not mean that behavior is random, but we are free from the causal influences of past events. According to freewill a person is responsible for their own actions.

One of the main assumptions of the humanistic approach is that humans have free will; not all behavior is determined. Personal agency is the humanistic term for the exercise of free will. Personal agency refers to the choices we make in life, the paths we go down and their consequences or humanistic psychologists such as Maslow [30] and Rogers [31] freedom is not only possible but also necessary if we are to become fully functional human beings. Both see self-actualisation as a unique human need and form of motivation setting us apart from all other species. There is thus a line to be drawn between the natural and the social sciences.

To take a simple example, when two chemicals react there is no sense in imagining that they could behave in any other way than the way they do. However when two people come together they could agree, fall out, come to a compromise, start a fight and so on. The permutations are endless and in order to understand their behavior we would need to understand what each party to the relationship chooses to do.

Ranged against the deterministic psychologies of those who believe that what "is" is inevitable are therefore those who believe that human beings have the ability to control their own destinies. However there is also an intermediate position that goes back to the psychoanalytic psychology of Sigmund Freud. At first sight Freud seems to be a supporter of determinism in that he argued that our actions and our thoughts are controlled by the unconscious. However the very goal of therapy was to help the patient overcome that force. Indeed without the belief that people can change therapy itself makes no sense.

This insight has been taken up by several neo-Freudians. One of the most influential has been Erich Fromm [29]. In "Fear of Freedom" he argues that all of us have the potential to control our own lives but that many of us are too afraid to do so. As a result we give up our freedom and allow our lives to be governed by circumstance, other people, political

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ideology or irrational feelings. However determinism is not inevitable and in the very choice we all have to do good or evil.

Thus, Leibniz saw all this as a hierarchical organized scheme of immaterial substances. There was a plurality of this which he called monads. This invariably means that, these mental realities like: thought, emotions, perceptions and behavior, sensation, memory and imagination, personal identity, freewill and determination which are product of the universe of monads are equally preestablised in harmonious way. Believing such that the monads do not actually interact, but they are so arranged that an occurrences with one in an exact harmony with an occurrences with another. For him, this is possible because the universe is in a harmonious system.

Problems

The problem with such theories as the occasionalism of Guelincx and Malebranche or the preestablised harmony of Leibniz is that, while they provide an account of why acts of minds and body seems to go together, they do so by introducing hypotheses that could in no way be verified. It is harder to believe that mind and body, thought, emotions, perceptions and behavior, sensation, memory and imagination, personal identity, freewill and determination somehow affect each other directly than to believe that somewhere from on high a supreme being is creating beautiful orchestration of reality. Such a solution was far too stagey.

Conclusion

In its dualistic conclusion, Cartesian rationalism opened the door to one of the major problems of modern man.- alienation. Attempt to close this door by talking about divine synchronization and preestablisehed harmony would not work because, for a man to really feel at harmony with life, reality has to be harmonious. That all is ultimately of one substance means there is no basis for alienation, and man can truly feel at home in the universe of many contents, Geulincx, Malebranche and Liebniz could not gloss over Descartes's discovery that men, through their consciousness, are aware from their difference from that which is outside of them. In all dualistic and pluralistic accounts of reality men are creatures alien to one another and to nature, and to their mental concepts.

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